Saturday, August 12. 2006
By Barry Rubin (Jerusalem Post)
The UN Security Council cease-fire resolution is not so bad in theory, but everything will depend on how it is implemented, and there are some very big problems on that front.
There are two basic parts of the resolution. The introductory ("PP") paragraphs, which set out the framework for interpreting it, and the operational paragraphs ("OP"). Every word is carefully chosen, often fought over by American and French diplomats, and has significance.
In the opening section there are a number of points that fit the original US conception and are fair to Israel:
The war and resulting deaths are blamed on Hizbullah attacking Israel (PP-2).
The purpose of the cease-fire is defined as not only ending the current fighting but changing the situation which brought about the conflict. (PP-3)
The unconditional release of Israel's soldiers is mandatory (PP-3).
The goal is to have a long-term, permanent solution to the problem (PP-9). Four other provisions are intended to meet Lebanese demands but are not necessarily very much inimical to Israel.
The issue of the three Lebanese prisoners is to be "settled." This does not mean they will be freed. It is a sign of the depravity of the present world that the UN has to have a resolution about the fate of three murdering terrorists - one of whom killed a father in front of his son and then shot the child dead - convicted in a properly constitute court. But again, this issue is merely to be discussed. (PP-4)
Israel's withdrawal is supposed to be at the "earliest possible" time and not immediately as the Lebanese government had demanded (PP-6).
It takes note of Lebanon's current claim to the Shaba Farms area but does not accept it. Since the claim is so weak and Syria is unlikely to support it officially, nothing is likely to happen on this issue. (PP-7)
Lebanon will send its army into the southern part of the country (which Israel also wants). The new international force will be called UNIFIL (as Lebanon wanted), but will effectively be an entirely new institution (PP-6). Instead of a small number of observers it will be comprised of 15,000 troops.
It is understandable why the United States and Israel agreed to the above wording since, while it doesn't give them everything they want, it is reasonable given what might be expected.
But all this wording is also only a prelude to the list of things to be done, the OP section. Here, too, the shape of the resolution is not so bad except for whether - given three key problems - it will be implemented properly.
Moreover, Israel only has to withdraw when the Lebanese army moves in and not, as the Lebanese government wanted, immediately (OP2). On the negative side, though, this means Israeli forces would probably have to leave before the large international force arrives. The longer it takes for international forces to get there, the worse this is.
The internationally recognized border is to be respected (OP4). International aid is to be given to Lebanon for reconstruction. (It is interesting to ask why no one has ever called for international reconstruction aid for Israel.) And all this should result in a long-term solution (OP8), perhaps a hint that Lebanon should make peace with Israel.
This all brings us to the key provision: "The establishment between the [international border] and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL?." The question, of course, is whether this is going to happen.
But the central contradiction in the document is between OP11 and OP12. OP11 basically makes UNIFIL action dependent on the Lebanese government asking for help. In other words, only if the government asks UNIFIL to fight against terrorists in southern Lebanon or interdict arms smuggling can it act.
Yet OP12 says UNIFIL can take "all necessary action" in its area of deployment to fulfill its mission. This could be interpreted, for example, to mean that the UNIFIL units will attack terrorists south of the Litani without being explicitly asked to do so by the Lebanese government.
Thus, the ceasefire agreement is not necessarily a disaster for Israel though it certainly isn't a solution either. It may provide some years of peace.
For Lebanon, though, it is a political disaster. Certainly, the terms are not going to let a strong Lebanese government emerge or stymie Syrian and Iranian ambitions. It will permit an end to the current war and reconstruction, but only until Hezbollah, Damascus, and Teheran decide they want to fight on Lebanese territory again.
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