Whither the SLA?

"Had they called me in," says M, "I would have told them, don't send in soldiers right away, it's a trap."

What would he have suggested, had he been able to help prepare a battle plan?

"I would definitely not have entered villages straight away, like the IDF did. They should have encircled those villages where all the Hezbollah fighters were, to prevent them from escaping, and then bomb them from the air.

"Also," M continues, "I would have told them not to bomb civilian centers like Beirut and Tyre, but to focus their bombing raids on Hezbollah hubs like Bint Jbail and Maroun a-Ras.

"All Israel succeeded in doing," he says sadly, "was to turn the Lebanese people into Hezbollah supporters."

"Watching the war from home on the television was a total disappointment," adds D, who served in the SLA's equivalent of the Shin Bet security service. "It hurt a lot to see all those Israeli soldiers getting killed... the IDF's plan was not so smart. It made me think that the IDF doesn't realize what Hezbollah is like."

While S watched news of the fighting he, too, couldn't figure out why the IDF didn't carry out more air strikes on the southern villages where the Hezbollah fighters were entrenched, before sending in soldiers.

"I know that Israeli soldiers are better than Hezbollah fighters," he says, "so when I saw what was happening in Bint Jbail [where Israel lost several soldiers during the month-long conflict] I said to myself, why are they suffering so many losses? Have they forgetten Hezbollah's style of fighting?"

IT WOULD be fair to ask how much SLA fighters have forgotten, considering that they, too, have been absent from Hezbollah's stomping grounds as long as Israeli soldiers have. Likewise, the well-trained, well-equipped forces that Israel encountered in Kantara and Marjayoun last month were not the same guerrillas that, despite their shortcomings, still managed to chase the SLA from its outposts years ago.

"It's true," says M, "that things have changed. When we were there, Hezbollah was not so well armed; mostly, they had older weapons. And, they used less efficient tactics. Now, I know, they're much better."

But the real problem, he says, is that "it's hard for Israel to fight them effectively as a democratic state, with principles and a large army. You can't fight guerrillas unless you act like guerrillas, too."

It's precisely that point, though, that makes the SLA's experience so salient.

And, it isn't entirely true that the veterans now in Israel are removed from what's happening in Lebanon.

M sees much of what happens in his homeland through the eyes of his family members, almost all of whom are still there. He can't speak directly to them over the phone, because it's too dangerous.

"They listen to the conversations," he explains. "But I can speak with my mother in the United States. We speak in code about what's happening with our family in Lebanon."

"I know that Israeli soldiers are better than Hezbollah fighters," he says, "so when I saw what was happening in Bint Jbail [where Israel lost several soldiers during the month-long conflict] I said to myself, why are they suffering so many losses? Have they forgetten Hezbollah's style of fighting?"

IT WOULD be fair to ask how much SLA fighters have forgotten, considering that they, too, have been absent from Hezbollah's stomping grounds as long as Israeli soldiers have. Likewise, the well-trained, well-equipped forces that Israel encountered in Kantara and Marjayoun last month were not the same guerrillas that, despite their shortcomings, still managed to chase the SLA from its outposts years ago.

"It's true," says M, "that things have changed. When we were there, Hezbollah was not so well armed; mostly, they had older weapons. And, they used less efficient tactics. Now, I know, they're much better."

But the real problem, he says, is that "it's hard for Israel to fight them effectively as a democratic state, with principles and a large army. You can't fight guerrillas unless you act like guerrillas, too."

It's precisely that point, though, that makes the SLA's experience so salient.

And, it isn't entirely true that the veterans now in Israel are removed from what's happening in Lebanon.

M sees much of what happens in his homeland through the eyes of his family members, almost all of whom are still there. He can't speak directly to them over the phone, because it's too dangerous.

"They listen to the conversations," he explains. "But I can speak with my mother in the United States. We speak in code about what's happening with our family in Lebanon."

On both sides of the border, M says, there is a feeling that Hezbollah has been anything but crippled.

"This is no victory for the IDF," he says. "And what's more, this is only the beginning. I'm telling you, one day Hezbollah will reach Kiryat Shmona."

"This was only the first stage," agrees S, who can't understand why Israel accepted the cease-fire without inflicting greater damage on Hizbullah.

"Israel needs to continue the fighting, because this is not the end. It must cut off the head of the snake, not merely its tail," says D.

"You know," he continues with a sigh, "we really could have helped."

For the IDF to ignore the possible advantages of consulting the ex-fighters, says Dr. Mordechai Kedar, "is pure arrogance."

"Israelis tend to think that they can do everything through the strength of their weapons; they think they don't need anyone who speaks Arabic, or who undersands the Arab mentality, in order to fight Arabs," says Kedar, a member of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies at Bar-Ilan University who has 25 years of experience in the IDF's Military Intelligence. "They wouldn't even consider talking to former SLA men."

Still, D concludes hopefully, perhaps the fighting will continue, and the former SLA men will soon get their chance to contribute.

"If people are willing to help," asks S, "why not use them?"

The Jerusalem Post asked the IDF Spokesman's Office the same question. There was no answer.