IRIS Blog

Palestinian terrorist organizations were studying the Lebanese-Israeli war to learn how to play on Israel's weaker points. 'Samaria has become the land of Islamic Jihad following the disengagement.' Approximately 15,000 guns, 4 million bullets, 2,300 pistols, 38 rockets, dozens of anti-tank missiles, 15 tons of TNT, 400 RPGs, and 10-15 Katyushas had been smuggled into Gaza from Egypt.

After three to five years of this kind of weapons transfer, he warned, Israel will face a situation similar to south Lebanon.

"At this point, anybody who wants to smuggle something through the Philadelphi route can apparently do so," Diskin said. "You can smuggle anything through Philadelphi except maybe a tank or plane."

What do we need to do these days? Not much. To prevent the renewal of war in Lebanon and to win the war should it begin anew. To avoid the outbreak of war with Syria and to win a war against it should one break out. To prevent Iran from developing its nuclear capability and to deter the country should it become a nuclear power. To build the Israel Defense Forces from the foundations up, as fast as possible. To rehabilitate the political system immediately. To come up with a leadership from thin air. To formulate, overnight, a national strategy. To carry out a regime change. To initiate a revolution in values. To reestablish the Israeli republic.

The timetable is tight. Very tight indeed. The cease-fire in Lebanon is not stable and will not be. The truce is caught in the dilemma of whether to come to terms with Hezbollah's powerful presence or whether to take forceful action against the organization and chance an escalation. There is total uncertainty also along the Syrian border. The possibility of a sudden Syrian move on the Golan Heights is not out of the question.

On the other hand, on the Iranian front the picture is crystal clear: By wintertime the moment of truth will come. If the United States attacks Iran, Israel will be attacked. If the United States does not attack, Israel will be faced with the most serious challenge to its existence since the day of its establishment.

Those who say that there is no comparison between the situation at the end of the second Lebanon War and the situation at the end of the Yom Kippur War are right. The current situation is by far more dramatic. Indeed, the number of fresh graves in military cemeteries at the end of this summer is much smaller than that after the fall of 1973, but the situation at the end of the war is much, much more fragile and dangerous.

In the fall of 1973, Israel was perceived by its neighbors as a wounded but powerful bully. At the end of summer 2006, it is viewed by its neighbors as a scarred, impotent wimp. In the fall of 1973, the American superpower regarded Israel as a bleeding lion. In 2006, the U.S. sees Israel as a fat hound dog that has lost its nerve and its value.

In 1973, the IDF emerged from the war with chief of staff David Elazar and Major Generals Yitzhak Hofi, Yisrael Tal and Arik Sharon threatening both Cairo and Damascus. In the end of the summer of 2006, the IDF is emerging from the fighting with the head of Northern Command Udi Adam, Deputy Chief of Staff Moshe Kaplinsky and Chief of Staff Dan Halutz not even posing a threat to the Al-Khiam ridge.

The criticism within Labor was led by ministers Ophir Pines-Paz and Eitan Cabel, who announced that they would vote against the commission outlined by Olmert and said they would try to persuade other ministers to do the same. The Labor Party chairman, Defense Minister Amir Peretz, declined Monday to comment on Olmert's decision.

Pines-Paz called for a state commission, calling it the right way and the only way, to investigate the war. "I intend to oppose [Olmert's decision] in the government, and will try to convince other ministers," he said. "The commission Olmert has appointed to investigate the political echelons does not have clear authority or a timetable, and increasing the number of commissions of inquiries will lead to chaos."

Olmert's decision is likely to further enrage critics, who say that the prime minister and other top officials should be the focus of the investigation and not its overseer.

Critics have been demanding a full-blown state commission of inquiry that has the authority to dismiss officials. Israel has carried out such inquiries after past crises - including the 1982 Lebanon War - that led to the dismissal of then defense minister Ariel Sharon.

They come from opposite ends of the political spectrum, but MKs Matan Vilna'i and Yuval Steinitz share some strikingly similar sentiments about the failures of the war in the North. In their analyses, expressed in separate interviews, many of the flaws stem not from a lack of information on the enemy, but from an appalling inability to internalize and act on that information.

Matan Vilna'i: When the chief of staff presents a war plan, ministers have to ask him the right questions, to be sure they know what Israel is getting into. That didn't happen.

Yuval Steinitz: The blunders of the war in Lebanon reflect a combination of complacency and dubious dogma. I'm worried that we're still underestimating the threat.

Prime Minister Ehud Olmert has established committees of inquiry devoid of any real basis and lacking in public credibility. The results they produce will be viewed with distrust.

Olmert is well aware of the differences between the various tools of inquiry. He evaded the governmental decision to establish a state committee because it would have been comprised of members nominated by the president of the Supreme Court, and because a former senior Supreme Court justice would have headed it. Olmert knows that the public would attribute great importance to the findings of such a committee.

The prime minister has also circumvented a governmental committee of inquiry headed by a former senior justice - a committee that would have had the investigative authorities of a state committee of inquiry.

Olmert's laboratory has concocted committees of inquiry that are internal by nature, even if they do include members outside the system.

Even if the committee does have any actual investigate authority, the fact that the government has control over nominating its members and the publication of its report turn the governmental inquiry into a national farce.

Olmert hasn't gained anything by creating the committees. He hasn't even bought himself a political grace period. It is likely that that voices calling for a state committee of inquiry and political responsibility won't be quieted any time soon.

The High Court of Justice is supposed to review a petition calling for the creation of a state committee of inquiry. In the past such petitions have been rejected. However, it has been made clear that judicial intervention is possible in "unusual and irregular" cases. The second Lebanon war is precisely that.

PM nixes call to form stronger state commission because it "would paralyze entire system. It "would not prepare for the future, which is to deal with the Iranian threat." According to Olmert, "A state inquiry commission headed by a judge would paralyze the entire system. Everyone would then get a lawyer and concentrate on how to pin the blame on someone else."